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Racial Bias: The Black Athlete,
Reagan’s War on Drugs, and
Big-Time Sports Reform
Theresa Runstedtler
Len Bias was on the brink of unimagined worldly success—
pro stardom and millions of dollars in salaries and product 
endorsements. And it was all blown away in moments by a 
mistaken fling with drugs. But if his death inspires a war on 
drug dealers and a reform of college athletics, it will not have 
been in vain.
John Jacob, “The Len Bias Tragedy,” Baltimore 
Afro-American, 22 July 1986
Too many ivory tower types on faculties who choose to ig-
nore sports scandals consider them unrelated to their teaching 
and research. And the factory system of education found at 
large universities has given administrators enormous power. 
Most faculty members are convinced they have little effect 
on athletic matters. Few faculties have attempted to speak out 
collectively on this issue.
 
“College Athletics’ Smoking Gun,” Christian Sci-
ence Monitor, 21 July 1986
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On the morning of June 19, 1986, the University of Maryland’s (UMD) 
African American star basketball player Len Bias died of cocaine intoxication. 
Bias’s death sent shockwaves across the United States, for less than two days 
before, the illustrious Boston Celtics of the National Basketball Association 
(NBA) had drafted him in the first round, offering him a lucrative contract. 
Young, gifted, black, and now on the cusp of being wealthy, he had everything 
to live for; he was the epitome of the American Dream, a story of racial uplift 
through intercollegiate athletics. Yet, his life was now over thanks to one night 
of celebration with an illicit drug in a college dorm room.
Even before the NBA draft, Bias was already nationally renowned. He was 
the UMD Terrapins’ all-time leading scorer, a two-time Atlantic Coast Confer-
ence (ACC) player of the year, and named to the All-America Team. A dynamic 
player who moved with exuberance, one sports journalist described Bias as 
akin to Muhammad Ali on the court.1 At 6’8”, 210 pounds, he was a picture of 
health and vitality.2
In a matter of days, his death became the center of a national conversa-
tion about the dangers of cocaine, especially the new “demon drug” of crack 
cocaine, and the need for a more concerted war on drugs.3 Bias’s tragic demise 
and its aftermath typically garner a line or two in most histories of President 
Ronald Reagan’s war on drugs and the so-called crack epidemic as a catalyst 
for the increasingly punitive turn in drug policy and the concomitant criminal-
ization of African Americans.4 However, no one has yet unpacked why this up-
and-coming black athlete became one of the chief symbols driving the frenzied 
rush to national action and the resulting expansion of the neoliberal carceral 
state. By analyzing the racial and gendered formation of the black athlete as 
Figure 1: Photo of University of Maryland basketball star Len Bias. Photograph 
by The Washington Post, courtesy of Getty Images.
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criminal suspect, this article builds on work that explores the cultural construc-
tion of the war on drugs and the normalization of punitive logic in the United 
States.5
The fallen Bias proved to be a flexible figure that government and univer-
sity officials from across the political spectrum used to support various types 
of policy reform. At the same time that Bias’s death became a justification for 
the criminalization of black youth beyond the university, it also inspired calls 
for the more systematic disciplining of black athletes, along with the expansion 
of policing on college campuses. However, Bias’s drug abuse at UMD was not 
the only cause for concern. In the weeks after his death, reports surfaced expos-
ing Bias’s and his teammates’ academic failures.6 Although a senior, Bias was 
twenty-one credits short of graduation, and he had dropped two and failed three 
courses in his last term. Likewise, four of his teammates had flunked the previ-
ous semester. These revelations sparked debates about the proper management 
of “student athletes” in revenue-producing sports, particularly NCAA Division 
I men’s basketball and football, which by the mid-1980s were dominated by 
black male athletes.7
In addition to exploring the national calls for a more sweeping war on 
drugs that followed Bias’s passing, this article examines UMD’s response 
through a critical analysis of two university task force reports: (1) The Task 
Force on Academic Achievement of Student-Athletes: Final Report (September 
1986) and (2) The Model University Program for Education & Prevention of 
Drug Abuse (December 1986). Facing mounting public criticism and hoping 
to repair the university’s damaged reputation, UMD officials had announced 
the appointment of the two task forces on June 30.8 In both cases, the resulting 
reports framed black athletes in revenue sports as a special, “at-risk” population 
that threatened to contaminate the supposed amateurism of college sports and 
the moral and academic standards of predominantly white institutions (PWIs).9 
Cast as a “problem,” black male athletes were not only denied the same consti-
tutional rights as regular students, but they were also subject to surveillance and 
disciplinary action for failing in a system designed to exploit their athletic labor 
at the expense of their academics.
Thanks to Maryland’s policy of self-support, by the time of Bias’s death, 
UMD’s athletic department was already a profit center that operated outside the 
constraints of the state budget for the university. According to Molly Dunham of 
the Baltimore Evening Sun, UMD’s athletic department was effectively “a cor-
poration within the university, a self-supporting business enterprise with a $7.3 
million budget.”10 The policy of self-support diminished the authority of the 
university’s academic officials over athletics, while empowering the Terrapin 
booster club, which largely financed athletic scholarships through contributions 
to the somewhat ironically named Maryland Educational Foundation. It also 
created perverse economic incentives to recruit the best and most pliant bas-
ketball players, regardless of their academic records. UMD needed a winning 
basketball team to market itself as a successful and racially inclusive institution 
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on the national stage, and the athletic department needed the basketball team’s 
$1.67 million dollar profit (thanks in large part to its lucrative television con-
tract) to fund the rest of its sports, with the exception of football. The logic of 
self-support turned UMD’s and other public universities’ athletic departments 
into privately controlled businesses that embraced the logic of corporatization: 
As the number of highly paid coaches and administrators increased, athletic 
labor remained poorly paid and precarious.
Despite these resonances, the emerging literature on the rise of the neolib-
eral, multicultural university has been rather quiet on the role of intercollegiate 
sport, especially revenue-producing, majority-black sports such as basketball 
and football, in the shaping of institutional cultures and practices. In the wake 
of the 2008 economic collapse and the rise of the Occupy movement, American 
studies scholars have begun to analyze the increasing criminalization of stu-
dents, disciplining of protest, and militarization of college campuses.11 There is 
also a growing body of work that analyzes the neoliberal university’s contain-
ment of minority difference and implementation of “official antiracisms.”12 Al-
though sports scholars and economists have long pointed to the rampant com-
mercialization of NCAA sports and its impact on U.S. colleges and “student 
athletes,” their analyses have made only fleeting appearances in these recent 
critiques.13 This article attempts to bridge these conversations. After all, the 
relative silence in American studies about university athletics is puzzling, since 
in some respects, black athletes at PWIs in the 1970s and 1980s were the ca-
naries in the coalmine, their circumstances foreshadowing larger trends in the 
punishment of student dissent, the policing of campus spaces, the casualization 
of labor, the privatization of higher education, and the deployment of the logic 
of diversity.
Moreover, critical histories of the status of “student athletes” in big-time 
NCAA sports have tended to overlook how racial frames helped to push the 
conversation toward minor reforms and the disciplining of individual players, 
rather than systemic changes. Much of the literature treats the race and class 
status of the young men in revenue sports as incidental rather than constitutive 
in shaping the policies aimed at managing “student athletes.”14 However, it is 
not coincidental that in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the “revolt of the black 
athlete,” which included boycotts and protests at hundreds of colleges across 
the nation, corresponded with the increasingly insecure status of “student ath-
letes.” The stripping of the last vestiges of labor protections accompanied the 
darkening of revenue-producing intercollegiate sports. Division I NCAA ath-
letes (growing numbers of whom were African American) became amateur in 
name only, as their performance in sport became inextricably connected to their 
compensation. For instance, in 1967, the NCAA ruled that athlete scholarships 
could be taken away from players who voluntarily withdrew from sports; in 
1972, they repealed the freshmen ineligibility rule; and in 1973 they replaced 
four-year scholarships with one-year renewable grants tied to athletic perfor-
mance.15 NCAA and university officials were careful to cast athletic work as 
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a privilege, all the while portraying themselves as humanitarian purveyors of 
black opportunity at a moment of urban chaos, supposedly thanks to dysfunc-
tional families and violent drug crime. As Bias’s story suggests, the broader war 
on drugs and the exploitation of black “student athletes” are not two separate 
phenomena, but rather two sides of the same neoliberal, carceral coin. The two 
systems thrived on the precarity of black life in late twentieth-century America.
Bias, Black Athletes, and the National War on Drugs
Because Bias was a high-profile African American basketball player, his 
death hearkened back to the drug panics of the 1970s and early 1980s that led to 
more comprehensive antidrug measures in big-time professional sports. These 
measures included expanded surveillance and policing through private security 
forces who worked in tandem with law enforcement agencies; persistent calls 
for mandatory, random drug testing; and increasingly harsh punishments, from 
criminal penalties to league fines, suspensions, and even expulsions. Although 
the leagues’ antidrug crusade started out as a war on performance enhancing 
drugs (PEDs), by the mid-1970s, the big-time sports leagues had deliberately 
shifted the conversation away from the systemic use of PEDs (and their part in 
it) to the individual misdeeds of players, particularly black players, using illegal 
street drugs.16
To their majority-white fans, the professional leagues touted themselves 
as the vanguard of the war on drugs, saving not only sport but also the nation 
from the supposed scourge of illicit narcotics. The racial dimensions of their 
crusade were clear. They were no longer looking for trainers who dispensed 
PEDs in the locker room, but rather for players with illegal drugs procured in 
the street. In the early 1980s, their framing of the purported “cocaine epidemic” 
in sports drew automatic associations with the drug trade in black inner cities, 
and not surprisingly, black athletes bore the brunt of this criminalization. Argu-
ably, the racial and gendered construction of the black athlete as drug abuser/
offender in this earlier moment provided ready justification for the criminal 
justice system’s broader targeting of young black men in Reagan’s stepped-up 
war on drugs.
Given this context, it is hardly surprising that Drug Enforcement Agency 
(DEA) Chief John C. Lawn automatically connected Bias’s death to the sup-
posed pathology of the black ghetto. “He grew up in an environment where 
drug use is pervasive,” Lawn stated. “Peer pressure killed him.”17 Yet, Bias did 
not grow up in the inner city; he was not the usual black suspect. Early reactions 
to his death in the press stressed that he came from a two-parent household in 
Landover, Maryland, a suburb of Washington, DC, just down the road from 
UMD’s College Park campus. Landover was emblematic of the rising black 
middle class, for it was located in Prince George’s County, an area that was 
over 40 percent African American by 1986. Bias’s father, James, was an electri-
cal repairman, while his mother, Lonise, worked at a nearby bank. Ven Chap-
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man, the family’s next-door neighbor described Bias as “an all-American kid,” 
“mamma’s and daddy’s baby.”18 Bias was known for having “a big smile and 
an affable disposition” and for generously mentoring children at Landover’s 
Columbia Park recreation center, “telling them to mind their school books as 
much as their sports.”19 Initially, the press also emphasized the fact that he was 
a “born-again Christian.” Even NBA Commissioner David Stern described Bias 
as “a poised, good-natured and friendly young man with a wonderful future”20
What made Bias’s cocaine-related death so compelling for local, state, and 
national politicians was the fact that even though he evoked it, he did not neces-
sarily fit the prevailing image of the unruly, drug-addled black athlete. As a na-
tive of Landover and a UMD athlete, Bias was a symbol that bridged the black-
white, urban-suburban divide. His death became representative of the broaden-
ing reach of the “cocaine/crack epidemic” reportedly ravaging the nation on 
multiple fronts. If cocaine could kill Bias, a young, elite intercollegiate athlete, 
after just one night of celebration, then cocaine could kill anyone. Moreover, 
newspaper reports about Bias often conflated powder cocaine, freebasing, and 
crack cocaine, and some even mistakenly claimed that crack had killed him.
Still, Bias and other black “student athletes” represented a racialized threat 
of contamination. Because of their hypervisibility in the media and their ac-
cess to formerly white spaces, from the suburb to the university, they were also 
seen as potential vectors of this drug epidemic. It did not help that right around 
the same time several former and current football players at the University of 
Virginia were charged with distributing cocaine on campus.21 Therefore, the 
circumstances surrounding Bias’s death allowed government officials, social 
leaders, and journalists from across the political spectrum to call upon the U.S. 
public (black and white) to support a massive mobilization against both sides of 
the drug equation–the supply side and demand side.
His death became a rallying point for the militarization of the U.S. public 
in a national war on drugs, whether defined in terms of drug education/reha-
bilitation and/or the repression of drug pushers/users.22 Although they tended 
to disagree on which strategy should be at the forefront of the drug war, both 
Democrats and Republicans framed the “cocaine/crack epidemic” in neoliberal 
terms, casting it as a matter of behavior, rather than a structural problem, that 
could either be educated/treated or punished away.23 Moreover, both cast it as 
a “crisis,” calling for a “state of emergency” that suspended the civil rights of 
citizens who distributed and/or used drugs. Conceptualizing the drug problem 
in these terms opened the door to sweeping, martial solutions.
As the criminal investigation into Bias’s death got underway, unsubstanti-
ated rumors started circulating that Bias and his friends had traveled to a known 
drug trafficking area in northeast DC, near Montana and New York Avenues, in 
order to purchase cocaine, including crack cocaine.24 For the previous couple 
of months, DC police had been monitoring the open-air “drug bazaar,” located 
near the predominantly black public housing project of Montana Terrace. As 
Captain James Nestor, head of the police department’s narcotics branch ex-
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plained, “The business started there to serve that community, and now they 
have customers coming in from outside the area.”25 Although these rumors re-
inforced the idea that drug crime happened in the poverty-stricken black urban 
ghettos, they also positioned the rising black middle class as possible vectors of 
vice in suburban neighborhoods and on college campuses.
Appropriating the hawkish language that white anti-marijuana advocates 
lobbed at federal officials in the early 1980s, black Democratic leaders were the 
most vocal in calling for a “war” on drugs in the immediate aftermath of Bias’s 
death.26 Even before the state medical examiner confirmed that Bias had died 
of cocaine intoxication, Reverend Jesse Jackson framed the tragedy as an argu-
ment for greater federal action. On June 23, in front of 11,000 mourners and a 
row of television cameras at UMD’s Cole Fieldhouse, Jackson declared, “God’s 
called him [Bias] for a higher purpose . . . to get the attention of this generation 
and to save it.”27 Jackson used hyperbolic imagery to underscore the severity 
of the mounting drug crisis in urban black areas. “The KKK and his rope, the 
shadow of death, have never killed so many people as the pusher of dope,” 
Jackson proclaimed; “Pushers are terrorists and death messengers.”28 Jackson 
endeavored to use the respectable, even heroic, black collegiate figure of Bias 
against a threatening backdrop of murderous drug pushers to garner national 
sympathy and attention. As Mike Littwin of the Baltimore Sun explained, “He 
[Jackson] hopes the children learn that drugs can kill and that no one, not the 
strongest of us, not the most blessed of us, not the most gifted, not the richest, is 
immune or invulnerable.”29 Jackson not only cast drugs as a universal threat to 
U.S. society but also drew a clear line separating law-abiding black Americans 
from black drug dealers.
Two days later, Representative Charles B. Rangel (D-NY) and Rev. Jack-
son called a Capitol Hill news conference, where UMD basketball coach Lefty 
Driesell and Boston Celtics President Red Auerbach joined them in a show of 
support. Rangel and Jackson again argued that Bias’s death “underscored the 
need for a national drive to combat drug abuse.”30 As chairman of the House 
Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, Rangel blamed the Rea-
gan administration for largely ignoring the growing drug crisis affecting black 
communities and for failing to come up with a coordinated antidrug campaign. 
“Even though the administration claims to have declared a ‘war on drugs,’ the 
only evidence we find of this war are the casualties,” Rangel argued. “If indeed 
a war has been declared, I asked the question when was the last time we heard 
a statement in support of this war from our Commander in Chief.” He noted 
that at the very same time that cocaine was flooding the United States, federal 
funds for drug education had been cut by 40 percent, and only $3 million of 
the Department of Education’s $18 million budget was allocated to antidrug 
education.
Mocking the Reagan administration’s overriding focus on combating 
“communism” and “terrorism” abroad, Jackson added, “We must see drug 
abuse as a threat to our culture greater than any ideology could ever be. We 
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must rally the government to the issue of drug abuse.”31 Jackson also called 
for random, mandatory drug testing in sports and industry, stating, “One does 
not have the civil right to take drugs.”32 Rangel and Jackson urged support for 
three House bills: The first would authorize $100 million annually to establish a 
program of federal grants to states for drug abuse education; the second would 
set aside $750 million over five years to assist state and local governments in 
drug enforcement and prevention activities; and the third was a House resolu-
tion that would require the president to convene a White House Conference on 
Drug Abuse in order to bring together experts to develop a national policy to 
combat drug abuse.33
Not everyone agreed with this panicked response. At basketball courts in 
the black areas of Brooklyn and Manhattan, Samuel Freedman of the New York 
Times observed that “most players treated Mr. Bias’s death more as a mistake, 
bad luck, even stupidity, than as a parable.”34 At the Col. C. Young Playground 
in Harlem, many were skeptical of the racialized hysteria surrounding Bias’s 
death. “In a society with rampant cocaine use by all races, they wondered aloud 
why a black man had been made into the symbol,” Freedman explained. “How 
many white youths stopped using drugs, one teenager asked angrily, when John 
Belushi died of an overdose of cocaine and heroin?” Special education teacher 
Kendall Cullins complained, “If it was Larry Bird who died, they’d say it was 
heart trouble. . . . If it was a white player, they’d cover it up.” Black ballplay-
ers at Foster Avenue Park in Flatbush were also wary of the moral panic sur-
rounding Bias’s death. Donald Graham speculated that Bias’s inexperience with 
drugs was what actually killed him: “If he’d been doing coke, he should’ve 
done it years ago, so he was used to it, and he’d’ve known how to handle it.” 
Meanwhile, transit worker Gerald Bunch pointed to the futility of calls for a 
war on street-level pushers. “You can get crack around here like going to the 
store,” Bunch explained. “The police come every day and bust people. But 
they’re little guys.” Although they did not dispute that drugs were readily avail-
able in their neighborhoods, they challenged the sensationalized interpretations 
of the African American ballplayer’s death.
Moreover, the reality on the ground defied the emerging narratives of na-
tional crisis and necessary war. As drug policy expert Arnold S. Trebach notes, 
the DEA’s special report, The Crack Situation in the United States (September 
1986), showed that media claims about the spread of crack across the country 
were wildly overblown. Crack use was still more or less contained to the black 
ghettos of a few major cities, and distribution remained decentralized, carried 
out, for the most part, by pushers who dealt in small quantities. Snorting pow-
der also remained the primary means of cocaine use, and cocaine use overall 
had leveled off in recent years.35 Still, the narrative of national crisis continued, 
as news stories quoted government drug experts who pointed to flawed statis-
tics that showed “a steep increase in cocaine-related deaths and emergency-
room treatment for effects of the drug.”36 Many articles spoke of cocaine’s over-
whelming “allure” that made normally rational people do irrational things.37
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It did not take long for Republicans to respond to Rangel and Jackson’s 
calls for war. They encouraged a two-pronged drug war that would target and 
punish both pushers and users. Republican leaders’ bellicose responses to Bias’s 
death help to shed light on “how the state mobilized and appropriated a range of 
reactions–including fear, anger, and disorientation–in African American com-
munities to justify repression and the increased militarization of law enforce-
ment.”38 Just two weeks after Bias’s death, Linda Chavez, former White House 
staffer turned GOP Senate contender in Maryland, weighed in with an antidrug 
platform of her own. Where she chose to unveil her plan spoke volumes about 
whom she imagined as the primary targets of the drug war. She spoke to the 
media from the “glass-strewn playground” of a West Baltimore public hous-
ing project–an area previously highlighted for its drug trafficking activity in 
the Evening Sun.39 Chavez pledged to “seek legislation that would allow juries 
to impose the death penalty on adults convicted of knowingly selling drugs to 
children under age 12,” to “increase funding to . . . agencies that investigate 
drug-related crimes,” and to “seek ‘stiff fines’ for recreational drug users.” She 
also called on professional sports league commissioners and college athletic di-
rectors “to require athletes disciplined for drug use to participate in educational 
programs aimed at children.” After making her announcement, Chavez shot 
a few hoops, passed out antidrug literature to children, and greeted adults on 
their stoops. It did not seem to matter that Bias actually hailed from suburban 
Maryland; he had come to embody racialized fears about the democratization 
of cocaine thanks to the arrival of the more inexpensive crack.
Zero tolerance became the Republican rallying cry for mobilizing the 
U.S. public in a ramped up war on drugs. Although previously used to justify 
the harsh punishment of marijuana dealers (imagined as nonwhite) in the late 
1970s, this discourse of no tolerance now rationalized the Republican adminis-
tration’s increasing focus on punishing users as a means to reduce the demand 
for drugs.40 On July 7, First Lady Nancy Reagan declared that the problem 
facing America was not a lack of awareness about the dangers of drug abuse 
but rather a sense of complacency. “By accepting drug use, you are accepting 
a practice that is destroying life—lives like that of Len Bias and countless kids 
next door,” the First Lady argued in a Washington Post editorial aptly titled, 
“The Need for Intolerance.”41 “Most people don’t feel that combating drugs has 
anything to do with them,” she maintained. “It’s for others to do—those who 
work in treatment centers or who have children on drugs or who live where 
drugs are openly traded on the street.” However, each American had a “person-
al, moral responsibility to fight drug abuse.” As the First Lady advised, “Each 
of us has an obligation to take an individual stand against drugs. Each of us has 
a responsibility to be intolerant of drug use anywhere, anytime, by anybody.” 
Whether “at a chic party” or “in a back alley,” drug use was both immoral and 
criminal.
Allowing the First Lady to pave the way, President Ronald Reagan did 
not publicly weigh in until July 10, when he announced the launch of his per-
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sonal crusade against drugs. One senior White House official claimed that Bi-
as’s death had provided the catalyst for the president’s new initiative. President 
Reagan vowed to be a “preacher against drug abuse” in order to “raise public 
consciousness” about the problem.42 Although he shied away from making any 
specific policy statements, the president rather skillfully shifted the national 
conversation away from top-level, supply-side enforcement, which, given the 
flood of drugs entering the United States in the mid-1980s, had proven largely 
ineffective. As David Hoffman of the Washington Post reported, “Reagan’s 
campaign is to be aimed at slowing the demand for them—in particular, seek-
ing to discourage potential drug users.”43 Yet, the expansion of drug testing, not 
drug education, was Reagan’s proposed method of reducing demand.
Shortly after the president’s announcement, the House Republicans also 
jumped into the fray, calling a press conference in which they publicly criti-
cized the Democrats for being too passive on the drug issue. With a dramatic 
air, Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-CA) stood next to a coffin as he denounced his 
Democratic counterparts for failing to act on any of the 26 bills in the House 
Judiciary Committee aimed at combating the drug problem. In response, House 
Speaker Thomas P. “Tip” O’Neill (D-Mass) quickly announced the launch of 
a bipartisan antidrug crusade. Rep. O’Neill also pledged Democratic support 
for the creation of a White House–appointed “drug czar” to coordinate the cru-
sade.44 In the weeks ahead, they would work with Republicans to draft a com-
prehensive antidrug legislative package for a vote on September 10. “We are 
going to see if we can come out with some kind of drug program that would 
have some teeth in it,” Rep. O’Neill maintained.
Although President Reagan initially shied away from talking policy, at the 
end of July he announced that he would unveil a legislative package “calling 
for stiffer penalties for drug dealers along with proposals to withhold federal 
funds from educational institutions and government contractors that fail to take 
positive steps to discourage drug use.”45 Appropriating almost word-for-word 
the language of Rangel and Jackson, President Reagan contended, “Those who 
smuggle and sell drugs are as dangerous to our national security as any terrorist 
or foreign dictatorship.” On the demand side, the president again endorsed the 
principle of mandatory drug testing in the workplace, even though he acknowl-
edged that it raised constitutional questions. “Drug users can no longer excuse 
themselves by blaming society,” President Reagan stated. “The rest of us must 
be clear that while we’re sympathetic, we will no longer tolerate the use of ille-
gal drugs by anyone.”46 Thus, drug dealers would face punishment, while drug 
users would face intolerance and discipline. In some respects, the Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act of 1986 (enacted on October 27), with its mandatory minimums for 
drug possession and its crack cocaine disparity that targeted black street deal-
ers, simply codified the public discussions surrounding Bias’s tragic death in 
the summer of 1986.
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Students or Athletes?
For John Jacob of the Baltimore Afro-American, Bias and other high-pro-
file black athletes had a crucial role to play in this national war on drugs. “If star 
athletes and molders of opinion use drugs for ‘recreational’ purposes how will 
we ever contain the raging epidemic in the streets?” Jacob asked. “Hopefully, 
Len Bias’ tragic death may help change the climate that tolerates drugs.”47 In-
deed, Jacob believed that black athletes had a “special responsibility” that went 
above and beyond that of white athletes. “Their white peers may be able to get 
away with dabbling in drugs, but they can’t,” Jacob asserted. “Aside from the 
personal dangers, they are role models in the community, worshipped among 
young blacks as white athletes never are in their communities. So they have 
to stay clean and act clean, or they’ll be implicity [sic] responsible for further 
tragedies.” Whether fair or not, Jacob maintained, black “student athletes” had 
to bear this racial burden at a moment when illicit drugs were flooding their 
communities.
Yet, as Jacob pointed out, this was not their only burden, for they also had 
to bear the weight of being black guests at PWIs. Admitted primarily for their 
athletic prowess, black basketball players at UMD remained on the margins of 
the academic institution, both literally and figuratively. Although they gained 
notoriety on campus for their performance on the court, the university did not 
see them or treat them like regular students. Even in the early 1980s, they lived 
in a separate athletic dormitory; they continued to be shunted into the general 
studies major, a flexible degree program used to help keep “student athletes” 
eligible for play; and their long season often kept them out of the classroom. 
As Jacob pointed out, Bias’s poor academic record was typical, rather than 
exceptional in the world of big-time NCAA basketball. What was unique was 
Bias’s success in the NBA draft. “Athletics as a vehicle to the pros works only 
for a small handful of the exceptionally talented players. The rest never make 
it,” Jacob noted. “Unless colleges get serious about helping those young people 
take the opportunity to earn degrees, they’ll move from the basketball court to 
the unemployment line.”48 For Jacob, not only had the Len Bias story shone a 
spotlight on the dangers of drug abuse, but it had also “helped expose the ex-
ploitation of college athletes.”
On June 24, the same day that the state medical examiner had announced 
the cause of Bias’s death, Wendy Whittemore, the academic counselor to 
UMD’s basketball team, had announced her resignation, citing “philosophical 
differences” with Coach Driesell.49 Whittemore told reporters that she felt edu-
cation was not Driesell’s top priority; after all, 5 out of 12 Terrapin basketball 
players had flunked out the previous semester. Speaking of her experience with 
Bias, she recalled, “Lenny was very bright and intelligent, and I had no ques-
tion whatsoever about his abilities under normal circumstances. But last season 
it seemed like every ACC game happened to fall on a Thursday, so all the guys 
missed a good number of classes.”50 These revelations put UMD officials on 
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the defensive, for they laid bare the hypocrisy of the term “student athlete.” 
Ironically, in 1985, an internal review of UMD’s Department of Intercollegiate 
Athletics (DIA) had given them a relatively clean bill of health. The review had 
looked at statistics regarding “student athlete” admissions, support programs, 
and academic achievements by sport, finding some room for improvement, but 
nothing signaling an imminent crisis.51 It seemed that UMD officials had their 
heads in the sand. “Driesell and Whittemore surely knew that the celebrated 
Bias was flunking out of his courses, and was in reality not a student,” African 
American sportswriter Carl Rowan asserted. “Top officials of the university 
should have known. Len Bias was being exploited by the university people 
around him in ways almost as venal as any cocaine peddler could have ex-
ploited him.”52
Not everyone agreed that “student athletes” were exploited. Some newspa-
per reports and alumni letters characterized black athletes as a polluting force 
on UMD’s campus, not only because of their propensity for drug crime, but also 
because of their failure to uphold the university’s academic standards. They ex-
pressed a sense of nostalgia for “simpler” times, usually in the decades before 
the 1960s, when college athletes were hardworking students first and when their 
hardest drug of choice was beer.53 Sports studies scholars have shown that this 
idea of an untainted “amateur” past is more myth than reality.54 However, the 
public commentary surrounding Bias’s death illustrates that this sense of white 
nostalgia for the “good old days” was in part a reaction to the darkening of the 
Division I athlete pool. Black athletes, especially those who did not appear to 
conform to the utmost discipline and restraint, became popular scapegoats for 
the very system of commercialized athletics that profited from their precarious 
status and poorly compensated labor. In effect, as the public face of big-time 
NCAA sports became black, the public became at best ambivalent about “stu-
dent athletes’” labor. Much like the professional leagues, the NCAA and its 
member institutions were able to sidestep systemic critiques by showing their 
majority-white fans that they were committed to protecting the supposed sanc-
tity of amateur sport in the face of racial integration and rampant commercial-
ization. In doing so, they shifted the onus and blame for any rules violations and 
academic failures back onto the individual athletes, particularly black athletes, 
while washing their hands of culpability in the matter.
Letters to Alumni Affairs in response to the revelations of Bias’s drug use 
and academic failure show that some UMD graduates viewed black athletes as 
a dangerous contagion on the university campus.55 One alumna declared, “It is 
my opinion that there is absolutely no excuse for permitting mental degenerates 
such as those on the basketball team who manage to receive Fs and dropouts 
for their scholastic efforts. The Chancellor alone is responsible. I suggest you 
[UMD] consider dropping out of intercollegiate sports. The university system 
in the US can do without such ‘fine people’ like Len Bias, et al.”56 Indeed, sev-
eral alumni blamed UMD’s first African American chancellor, Dr. John Slaugh-
ter, for failing to adequately discipline and decline admittance to second-rate 
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black “student athletes.” “Did he [Slaughter] know about their lack of academic 
prowess? Or did he know that most couldn’t get to class after doing a few lines 
(snorting coke through a straw)?” one alumna questioned. “I am sure that he 
knew; they were admitted with substandard skills . . . , they continuously cut 
class, they were continuously ‘readmitted,’ and they used drugs. I am also sure 
that if other students complained about drug use by athletes or rape or any-
thing else—NOTHING would be done to this most holy or should I say unholy 
group.”57 Some UMD graduates saw black athletes’ alleged criminality and in-
tellectual inferiority as reason enough to completely ban intercollegiate sports. 
Others argued that the manual labor of competitive sport (and the athletes who 
performed it) simply did not belong at an institution of higher learning. “Imag-
ine paying a bunch of knott [sic] heads a million dollars to perform physically 
what my father’s tenant farmer did every day in the week,” one alumna scoffed; 
“Do you call that CULTURE? Sure—day laborer class of culture.”58 It was 
clear that their imagined “student athlete” was black and that to them athletic 
scholarships represented the worst abuses of Affirmative Action.
Many fans contended that black basketball players should be grateful to 
the NCAA and their colleges for allowing them a chance to receive a “free” 
higher education. “The argument that the college athlete has been exploited 
unless he graduates or succeeds as a professional is valid only if one can prove 
that he would have otherwise done something else more constructive with his 
time,” UMD history professor and former small-time college football player 
Elbert Smith contended in a letter to the Washington Post. “The college athlete 
is offered an expensive free education. He has the thrills that go with playing a 
game he enjoys before great crowds of people,” Smith added.59 Not only was 
the athlete getting paid to play, but as Smith argued, “If the college athlete 
passes enough courses to remain eligible for four seasons, he is very likely to 
learn far more than he would have at a mundane job or walking the streets.” 
College athletics taught “the meaning of hard work, endurance, unselfishness, 
self-sacrifice, and self-discipline.” In Smith’s eyes, the NCAA and its member 
institutions were the nation’s leading purveyors of black opportunity: “Who can 
question the role of collegiate athletics in helping us achieve the racial democ-
racy called for by our basic ideology and religious values? Perhaps universities 
are not the proper instruments for this service, but no other organizations have 
come forward to do it better.” How could the NCAA and UMD be maligned and 
blamed for Bias’s death, when they had thrown open the door of opportunity to 
black “student athletes”?
Given their supposedly privileged status, black athletes were expected to 
uphold their end of the bargain. When the USA Today asked its readers, “Do 
universities have a special responsibility to help athletes academically?,” those 
who answered tended to argue that athletes simply needed to work harder.60 “No, 
universities do not have a special responsibility to help athletes. Athletes should 
be treated the same as other students,” declared Melanie Abdow, a 29-year-
old banquet manager from Washington, DC. Just because certain people were 
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“good in sports” did not mean “they should be carried through college by their 
professors or coaches,” Abdow contended. “Anybody who gets into college 
should be willing to struggle.” Likewise, Jim Martino, a 35-year-old business 
owner from Niagara Falls, New York, complained, “The story that sports are 
the only way out of the ghetto has been milked for so long that people are get-
ting tired of hearing it. The primary emphasis in college should be on educa-
tion.” Black “student athletes” should not have preferential treatment; they just 
needed to study harder in order to succeed at college-level academics and to 
create more career choices for themselves.
In answering its own question, the editorial board of the USA Today took a 
more middle-of-the-road position. Although they acknowledged that Division 
I sports were no longer merely extracurricular activities, but instead “money 
machines for their schools and farm systems for the pros,” they argued that 
universities merely had to reinforce the importance of academics over athlet-
ics.61 Rather than calling for systemic change, they contended that universities 
needed to find ways to better accommodate “student athletes” to the rigors of 
intercollegiate athletics. “Universities place special demands on student ath-
letes—hours of practice, days of travel, and heavy media attention,” they noted. 
“That’s why players need help; they need counseling and special attention so 
they can learn to cope.” In turn, they proposed a collective moral shift, rather 
than an economic one, to reform a corrupted enterprise in which all parties 
were at fault: “Colleges must return to developing the total person. . . . Coaches 
must remember that student athletes are more than just last night’s statistics. . . 
. Athletes must take responsibility for their own futures. And fans who support 
the win-at-any-cost system should remember they bear part of the blame, too.” 
If all involved were willing to change their mindset, the abuses and scandals 
would disappear under the regulatory watch of the NCAA.
In response to the rising accusations of exploitation, corruption, and hy-
pocrisy, UMD officials appointed a 24-member task force “charged with study-
ing and making recommendations concerning the academic achievements of 
student-athletes.”62 Chaired by Dr. J. Robert Dorfman, Acting Dean for the Col-
lege of Computer, Mathematical & Physical Sciences, the academic task force 
comprised UMD faculty and administrators, DIA personnel, students, alumni, 
and retired professional athletes. Even though the task force was charged with 
examining UMD athletics as a whole, it is clear from the final report that the 
imagined “student athlete” in crisis was black. In framing the problem as one 
of black athletes’ academic failure at UMD, the task force avoided larger sys-
temic questions about the integral role of a flexible, low-paid black labor force 
in sustaining the profitability of big-time intercollegiate sports. Instead, echo-
ing much of the discussion in the popular media, their report recommended 
higher admissions standards, greater discipline, and more specialized services 
for academically at-risk “student athletes.” It also called for the development 
of more standardized policies and procedures for the DIA and for the stricter 
enforcement of existing UMD and NCAA regulations. In doing so, it followed 
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what historian Taylor Branch identifies as the typical athletic reform trend of 
“making changes around the edges.”63
The section of the task force report entitled “Recruiting, Admissions, and 
Orientation” embodied this reformist approach. In all aspects of recruiting the 
task force found that the men’s basketball program prioritized athletics over 
academics. In the case of admissions, the report revealed that DIA personnel 
wielded a lot of influence, leading UMD to admit increasing numbers of “stu-
dent athletes” who were academically at risk. And, when they arrived on cam-
pus, freshman athletes received an inadequate orientation to UMD’s various 
academic programs and nonacademic support units. Furthermore, the task force 
discovered that even freshman basketball players with sufficient academic cre-
dentials had difficulty making the transition to college because of their sport’s 
intense demands on their time.64 “The ACC schedule for basketball,” the re-
ported noted, “often results in a game at mid-week, followed by another on the 
weekend—scheduled at the convenience of television networks rather than the 
students’ academic schedule and life.”65
Nevertheless, the task force’s recommendations in these three areas com-
prised incremental changes that systematized rather than disrupted UMD’s 
profit-driven athletic program. The focus was on raising admissions standards, 
communicating to all involved that academics was paramount, and providing 
recruits and freshmen athletes with more information about UMD academics 
and campus life. In particular, the report encouraged UMD to be more transpar-
ent about “the joint responsibilities of the recruit and the University.”66 To that 
end, the task force drafted the Compact Letter of Agreement to be signed in 
tandem with a recruit’s National Letter of Intent.
The compact letter preserved the university’s paternalistic relationship 
with its “student athletes.” Couched in the language of privilege, duty, and dis-
cipline, it required that the recruit certify being made “aware of the personal 
and social opportunities for growth” that the university offered:
A. My participation in intercollegiate athletics provides me 
with the opportunity to pursue simultaneously a college de-
gree and serve the university community as well as the com-
munity at large.
B. I understand that my position as a student athlete means 
that I have an obligation to the university and to myself which 
requires that I develop responsible attitudes in dealing with 
personal, academic, and social pressures that can sometimes 
result in drug use, improper sexual behavior, and disruptive 
interpersonal relationships.67
“Being a student athlete is a privilege that should not be abused,” the letter 
continued. It prescribed that the athlete’s “main goal” was to graduate and that 
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academics must always to take precedence over athletics. It even stipulated 
that the athlete “not . . . exceed four absences in any one class during a given 
semester.” Thus, it fell back on individual “student athletes” to behave accord-
ing to these expectations, regardless of the very real structural impediments to 
their academic success. If they failed to live up to these standards, the blame 
was theirs to bear.
The task force’s review of UMD’s academic programs and policies for 
“student athletes” revealed that they were only nominally students. The aca-
demic support unit for athletes was not only understaffed, but it was also iso-
lated from the rest of campus. The unit was part of the DIA and reported to the 
athletic director, and its offices were located inside the Cole Field House. The 
unit’s main function was to keep athletes, especially those in revenue sports, el-
igible to play. Its counselors routinely encouraged the majority-black basketball 
and football players to major in general studies.68 Although this evidence raised 
real questions about the status of athletes as primarily laborers rather than stu-
dents, the report once again encouraged the development of better procedures 
and better services. It recommended that the academic support unit be moved 
outside the DIA and be managed by the Office of the Dean of Undergraduate 
Studies. It called for more and better-qualified staff. The report also encouraged 
the Campus Senate to investigate the general studies major, and it recommend-
ed research into new sports-related undergraduate majors for athletes such as 
sports management and sports journalism.69 The focus was on providing special 
services for “student athletes” to help better accommodate them to the rigors of 
big-time sports.
The search for ways to best acclimate “student athletes” to the existing 
system also permeated the report’s discussion of UMD’s nonacademic support 
services. For instance, the task force recommended that UMD work harder to 
ensure that more athletes used the campus Career Development Center. The 
report stated, “Student-athletes in the revenue sports are often unrealistic in 
their career goals. Despite the very low probability of success, many of them as-
sume that they will have a professional career in sports.”70 Moreover, the report 
noted that black “student athletes,” in particular, tended to have trouble adjust-
ing to life at UMD. Instead of forthrightly acknowledging the role of race and 
class in the alienation of black athletes on campus, the report argued, “Often 
the fact that they are recognizable campus figures prevents them from feeling 
comfortable or part of the campus community. They tend to restrict their circle 
of friends to other team members.”71 The task force’s suggested solutions were 
to increase the diversity of DIA personnel and to provide specific programs to 
help black athletes adapt to their new environment.72
However, much like “student athletes’” separate academic support unit, 
their segregated housing exemplified their exceptional status at UMD. This was 
particularly the case for the majority-black teams in revenue-generating sports. 
The task force found that up until around 1983, “male football and basketball 
players were housed in one dorm and grouped by team.” This segregated setup 
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“allowed easy supervision of their adherence to curfews and the dormitory was 
near the practice facilities.” Yet, it also “drew attention to them and the behav-
ior of one athlete was often attributed to every athlete, creating stereotyping of 
athletes.” In order to rectify this situation, the director of Resident Life had been 
“gradually persuading coaches to allow the athletes to be integrated into other 
dormitories.”73 The report called for UMD to better incorporate and treat these 
athletes as “regular members of the student population living on campus,” not 
necessarily because this housing arrangement left them vulnerable to undue 
discipline and racist scrutiny, but because the task force believed “exposure to 
other students” would provide them with “role models who present a variety of 
options in handling college.”74
Despite its many recommendations, the task force acknowledged that any 
improvements to the academic achievements of UMD’s “student athletes” 
would not materialize if the NCAA and ACC kept doing business as usual. 
“There are still other possible improvements in our programs, which if imple-
mented unilaterally, would put our athletics programs at a considerable com-
petitive disadvantage,” the report admitted.75 The only recourse was to have 
UMD representatives urge the NCAA and ACC to implement certain changes 
across the board. For instance, the task force called on UMD reps to urge both 
governing bodies to limit the length of sports seasons to one semester and to 
ban freshmen eligibility in revenue sports.76
In the end, the task force returned to the language of proper procedure and 
enforcement, and personal responsibility. “Instead of coming up with a set of 
sweeping reforms,” it sought to provide recommendations to “tighten and refine 
a system that would have functioned somewhat effectively had it been properly 
enforced and maintained by all relevant campus personnel.”77 As long as UMD 
followed the rules and provided the necessary support services to help athletes 
succeed academically, it was not engaging in exploitation. Yet, all of this left 
the fundamental question of athletes’ labor and constitutional rights more or 
less unexamined. As Jeff Riggenbach of the USA Today reminded sports fans:
If colleges and universities are going to be in the entertain-
ment business, earning big money by putting on nationally 
televised weekend spectacles for the enjoyment of the gen-
eral public, they owe the students who provide the talent for 
those spectacles at least the same treatment they accord to 
other school employees—the coaches and stadium managers, 
for example—who are involved. They owe them a competi-
tive wage and the freedom to conduct their private lives as 
they see fit.78
UMD did not offer a competitive wage, and with fears of a campus drug epi-
demic mounting, neither did they offer “student athletes” the freedom to con-
duct their private lives on their own terms.
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Drug Crackdown on Campus
In early July 1986, only a few weeks after Bias’s death, Secretary of Educa-
tion William Bennett called for zero tolerance of drugs on college campuses. In 
a speech before the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank in DC with 
close ties to the Reagan administration, Bennett proclaimed, “Every college 
president should write his students this summer and tell them this: ‘Welcome 
back for your studies in September; but no drugs on campus. None. Period.’”79 
Although he acknowledged that he had no power to enforce such a ban, he stat-
ed, “I will be glad to act if Congress gives me the authority to withhold federal 
funds from schools that do not protect their students from drugs.” Adding to 
the growing moral panic, he argued, “Parents should be able to expect colleges 
to do their best to keep pushers off campus and get drug users . . . off campus, 
if they are already there.” Although Bennett did not invoke racial language in 
his call for zero tolerance, black “student athletes,” with their imagined ties to 
cocaine from the urban ghetto, were automatically suspect.
Bennett encouraged “zero tolerance” in the midst of reports that university 
campuses had become spaces of widespread cocaine consumption. The Univer-
sity of Michigan’s annual survey on drug use for the National Institute on Drug 
Abuse (NIDA) announced a “current epidemic of cocaine use among young 
adults.” The survey found that 57 percent of college students said it was “fairly 
or very easy” to obtain cocaine and that 17 percent had used cocaine in the 
last year. Despite this alarmist framing, the study acknowledged that marijuana 
was still far and away the drug of choice on college campuses, with 42 percent 
using it within the last year. A survey of UMD students conducted by the cam-
pus Counseling Center seemed to further contradict the prevailing narrative of 
crisis. It found that the percentage of incoming freshmen that had used cocaine 
increased from 8 percent in 1973 to 14 percent in 1983, slightly below the na-
tional average of 17 percent.80
Although Bias’s death raised questions about the overall increase in ille-
gal drug use at UMD, the majority-black basketball team became the target of 
media scrutiny and slander. Any discussion of the basketball team was neces-
sarily a comment on the character of black “student athletes,” since 11 of the 13 
on the roster were African American. Newspaper reports tended to cast UMD 
basketball as a den of iniquity, in which coaches and officials allowed players 
to get away with illegal drug use and other NCAA violations. The Washington 
Times claimed that recent university graduates had disclosed “rampant and bla-
tant drug use and sales in Ellicott Hall—the ‘jock dorm’ on campus.”81 It did 
not help that Arthur Marshall, the state’s attorney for Prince George’s County 
in charge of the grand jury probing the circumstance of Bias’s death, made 
several public statements about UMD basketball players’ rumored drug use and 
gambling.82 When Bill Brubaker of the Washington Post asked if university of-
ficials had been aware of other Terrapins basketball players using illegal drugs, 
Athletic Director Dick Dull averred, “I have never heard any direct informa-
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tion linking drugs to anybody in the basketball program.”83 However, former 
player Steve Rivers told Brubaker a different story: “Both Dick Dull and Coach 
[Lefty] Driesell knew that at least one basketball player had experimented with 
marijuana. . . . That player was me.” When Brubaker subsequently confronted 
Dull with Rivers’ words, Dull reversed his statement.
Why did Brubaker seek out Rivers for his exposé? On January 28, 1984, 
the black guard from Long Island, New York, and his teammate Adrian Branch 
(also black) were arrested and charged with possession of $10 of marijuana. At 
the time, the arrest, conviction, and suspension of both players had garnered 
extensive media attention. Reportedly, Rivers had asked Branch to drive him 
to an area near UMD that was “known for drug dealing.”84 The dealer waved 
them down, and Rivers handed the dealer $10 for two nickel ($5) bags of mari-
juana. A Prince George’s County police officer witnessed the transaction, and 
Rivers, Branch, and their female companion were arrested and charged with 
possession. Two days later, the players received a suspension after meeting with 
Driesell and Dull. Rivers claimed, “I admitted it to Dick Dull and to Lefty that 
I had before experimented with marijuana.” Dull then asked them if they were 
involved with cocaine; they said no. Driesell reputedly stated, “Maybe we can 
let you guys back [on the team] sooner if you’re willing to take a urinalysis.” 
Branch consented because he had not used marijuana, but Rivers declined fear-
ing that the drug was still in his system. After both players were found guilty 
of a misdemeanor, fined $200, and ordered to perform community service, Dri-
esell reinstated them on the team. Whereas Branch passed his urinalysis test 
and returned to play, Rivers resigned when Driesell told him he would not be 
permitted to play.
According to Rivers, although their foray into drug use was by no means 
an isolated event, it was hardly what one could call an epidemic. Dismayed 
about his lack of playing time, Rivers had used marijuana to calm his frustra-
tion. He claimed he was not aware of any players who used cocaine and that 
their marijuana use was limited. “It wasn’t something like we all were trying 
every week or after every game or before every party,” Rivers argued. “It was 
something that happened, I can honestly say, like once a month. We decided, 
hey, let’s go out and do it. My experience was mostly with outside friends.”85 
Yet, Rivers stated that he actually never saw Bias use any illegal drugs during 
the two years that they were teammates: “Lenny was the kind of guy who could 
walk in a room, sit down and have a conversation with me and not touch a thing 
. . . not even a beer.” A graduate of UMD and now a telephone sales agent for 
TWA, Rivers told Brubaker, “A lot of people, sad to say, are using drugs. A 
lot of people are just not getting caught. I got caught.” Given the high rate of 
marijuana use at U.S. colleges in the 1980s, Rivers paid an unusually high price 
for his occasional use.
Although some African American commentators also believed UMD had 
a drug problem, they did not necessarily place black athletes at the center of 
collegiate drug culture. “There obviously exists a drug problem on the Univer-
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sity of Maryland campus,” Rita D. Chappelle of the Baltimore Afro-American 
stated, “one that is so rampant that it has infiltrated their athletic programs.”86 
Instead of demonizing them, Chappelle contended that black athletes’ drug use 
revealed both their commodification and disposability in the world of big-time 
basketball. Pointing to former Terrapin John Lucas, Chappelle argued that his 
drug use was “a well-kept secret at Maryland” that “got out of control” when 
he turned pro. Apparently no one from UMD or the NBA cared enough about 
his health and well-being to intervene and get Lucas help, so long as he kept 
producing on the court. Rather than a simple story of black pathology, black 
athletes’ drug use revealed a pattern of exploitation and negligence on the part 
of the leagues.
Regardless of whether they were sympathetic or not, these reports of Ter-
rapin drug use pushed UMD to put on a public relations offensive. On June 
29, UMD’s first African American chancellor, John Slaughter, appeared on a 
special episode of NBC News’ Meet the Press about “college and professional 
sports and the widespread use of drugs in American society.”87 Sportswriter 
Carl Rowan asked Slaughter, “Are you now convinced that you have a serious 
drug abuse problem among athletes at the University of Maryland?” Slaughter 
replied, “I’m convinced that there is a serious drug abuse problem in society 
which impacts us, as it does every other educational institution, and it is a prob-
lem we’ve got to deal with.” Rowan pushed him, “Are you suggesting that 
we may be wrong in focusing just on athletes, that you may have a serious 
drug problem, say, in your medical school?” Slaughter asserted, “I think it is 
wrong to focus only on athletes. Certain athletes represent a very visible, very 
important segment, and obviously one that needs to be looked at.” However, 
Slaughter argued that illegal drug use was not simply an athletic scourge but “a 
societal problem.”88
Unsatisfied with Slaughter’s response, later in the program Rowan probed 
Bob Lanier, the African American former head of the NBA Players’ Association 
and architect of the NBA’s antidrug program, about the racial dimensions of 
basketball’s supposed drug crisis. “Recent stories would make it appear that this 
is largely a black problem,” Rowan stated. “Why do you think so many black 
athletes are getting caught up in the drug abuse problem?” Lanier responded, 
“Carl, I don’t believe it’s a black problem. . . . I know white athletes that do 
drugs and I know black athletes—but right now there is so many more black 
athletes that are involved in major sports today.”89 The hypervisibility of black 
athletes had skewed public perceptions of drug use in big-time sports.
In response to allegations of drug abuse and crime, UMD officials appoint-
ed a 22-member drug task force mostly composed of state law enforcement 
and political leaders. Chaired by former U.S. Attorney General, Benjamin L. 
Civiletti, the panel’s role was “to review the existing status of drug policies, 
enforcement practices and education and counseling programs on the College 
Park Campus and provide recommendations for creating a model program.”90 
They planned to investigate the extent of drug use at UMD, to look at the rela-
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tionship between university police and outside law enforcement agencies, and 
to explore the possibility of mandatory drug testing, particularly for “student 
athletes.”91
It was clear from press interviews with several key task force members 
that they viewed the issue of drugs on campus as primarily a criminal justice 
matter. Howard B. Silverman, task force member and acting director of Mary-
land’s Drug Abuse Administration, announced, “Just because of what happened 
to Len Bias, you’re going to see some radical change on this campus .. . . Any-
body that deals drugs on this campus . . . is going to be very leery about coming 
back.”92 Likewise, Solomon Liss, a retired Maryland Court of Special Appeals 
judge and chairman of a task force subcommittee, told the Washington Times, 
“I also want to find out what, if anything, is done at the university to keep it se-
cure from criminal elements. If dope peddlers come on campus, are they given 
unlimited access or are some attempts made to keep them out?”93 Evidently, 
both Silverman and Liss viewed UMD’s drug problem as originating largely off 
campus, as criminals came in and preyed on the university community. Mean-
while, another task force member, Baltimore County School Superintendent 
Robert Y. Dubel, already had a reputation for zero tolerance of drugs. Dubel be-
lieved that his strict drug enforcement program in the county school system was 
the reason for his appointment to UMD’s drug panel. “It’s one of the toughest 
such programs of any school system in the country,” Dubel boasted. Operating 
in cooperation with the Baltimore County Police Department, the program used 
“undercover police cadets” to “infiltrate the schools” and make arrests. Close 
collaboration with outside police departments to apprehend both drug users and 
dealers was the potential solution to UMD’s supposed drug crisis.
Many of the UMD graduates who wrote letters to the Alumni Association 
in the months after Bias’s death agreed with this “get tough” approach and 
decried what they saw as the moral decline of the university in recent years. 
Some supported mandatory drug testing for all students, while others advocated 
unannounced room inspections. One ex-military man even suggested the use 
of narcotics dogs to search student rooms and cars. In addition, several alumni 
saw a campus crackdown on drug users as a crucial part of the national war on 
drugs. “It appears that President Reagan will be launching a major offensive 
aimed at the drug user,” one alumnus noted. “The University should be no less 
forceful in its handling of drug use by its students.”94 He also argued that “stu-
dent athletes,” in particular, had absolutely no right to expect privacy in this 
time of crisis. “To the extent that a few athletes become heroes and unfortu-
nately get more notariety [sic] than their contribution to society, it is fitting that 
their conduct be commensurately scrutinized,” he wrote. “Unless these people 
are given the harshest disciplinary action possible, they might survive to prove 
that our University and society has a tolerance for the drug user.” Given that the 
media tended to paint drug use at UMD as emanating from the majority-black 
basketball team, the racial implications of such comments were clear.
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UMD was not the only college contemplating how to secure its campus 
community against the growing drug menace. On July 9, Boston University 
(BU) president John Silber announced that all students must sign a release form 
giving the university the right to inspect their rooms for illegal narcotics. Al-
though this was still an uncommon practice for U.S. colleges, given concerns 
about students’ right to privacy, President Silber’s pronouncement drew praise 
from Education Secretary Bennett. Silber reportedly warned incoming fresh-
men that the university would “offer no sanctuary from the laws of the City of 
Boston, the State of Massachusetts or the United States.”95 He also noted that 
BU was working to control drug use among its athletes because of their very 
public role on campus. “They are heroes and mentors to other students,” Silber 
declared. “We make them read and accept our drug policy, which includes ex-
amination, and if they won’t accept this, they need not play at Boston.” Thus, 
the campus had to be protected from drug users, especially those who were 
“student athletes.”
Some university officials disagreed with intrusive and punitive approaches 
to drug enforcement. American University president Richard Berendzen main-
tained that “urine tests, lie detector tests, unannounced dorm checks and physi-
cal body checks” would only push students to use drugs off campus. Similarly, 
Robert Atwell of the American Council on Education, a lobbying group of 
1,400 U.S. colleges, contended, “Students need to know that their responsibil-
ity to obey the laws of society don’t [sic] end at the campus gates, nor are their 
rights as citizens curtailed by residing in a college community.”
Yet, there were already signs that the constitutional right to privacy afford-
ed to most students would not apply to “student athletes.” At the end of July, 
the National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics (NAIA) announced that 
its member colleges must adopt a drug education and screening program for 
their athletes by the end of 1986. The association’s chief administrator, Wally 
Schwartz, declared, “All students must participate in this [drug program] to 
participate in athletics. If they don’t wish to, they don’t play.”96 Likewise, UMD 
athletic department officials announced a proposal to institute mandatory, ran-
dom drug tests for “student athletes.”97
Published in December 1986, the drug task force’s formal report echoed 
many of the possible solutions discussed in the media. Although the task force 
operated under the assumption that the United States was in the midst of a 
drug epidemic, it acknowledged, “Nearly all persons, including students and 
University officials, who talked to the Task Force felt that the most serious 
substance abuse problem at College Park (and probably other universities) is 
with alcohol not other substances.”98 Those consulted pointed to “the number 
of students involved in alcohol-related incidents such as auto accidents, dam-
age to the dorms, and fighting incidents,” and UMD’s own disciplinary records 
confirmed their suspicions. From 1983 to 1986, out of a total of seventy-seven 
alcohol/drug cases brought before UMD’s Judicial Review Board, fifty were for 
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alcohol, twenty-three for marijuana, two for LSD, one for amphetamines, and 
one for cocaine.99
Despite these statistics and the wide consensus about the pervasiveness of 
alcohol abuse at UMD, the task force stressed that illegal drug use should still 
“be regarded as a serious problem.”100 Racially framing the problem of drugs 
in terms of its assumed associations with black inner-city spaces, the report 
suggested that UMD’s “urban” location in the metropolitan DC area made it 
susceptible to higher rates of drug use.101 According to the testimony of local 
police, most of the illegal drugs used at UMD were purchased off campus “in 
the adjoining District of Columbia and Prince George’s County areas.”102 The 
report also claimed that 75 to 90 percent of drug arrests made by campus police 
were of people with no affiliation to UMD.103 Therefore, university and local 
police forces needed to secure the campus perimeter to protect students from 
external criminal threats.
Although the report cautioned that UMD should not be unduly oppres-
sive in its campus-wide drug policy, it rationalized the targeting of “student 
athletes,” particularly those in the majority-black, revenue sports, for more in-
trusive forms of discipline. This strategy presumed the innocence of regular 
students and the potential guilt of “student athletes.”104 Moreover, the report 
constructed the “student athlete” as an exception, justifying their drug test-
ing under a paternalistic notion of protection. UMD’s selective approach to 
student drug testing was not unique. Sports scholar Kathryn Henne notes that 
regular drug testing of “student athletes,” endorsed by the NCAA, began in the 
1980s.105 Indeed, the majority of colleges polled in the task force’s national sur-
vey “indicated they had or were developing special efforts for student athletes. 
This ranged from drug testing (usually non-random urinalysis) to special pro-
visions for withdrawal of support, scholarships, etc., for violation of codes of 
conduct.”106 In turn, UMD had the support of its majority-white student body in 
the selective testing of “student athletes.” According to the task force’s student 
survey, 62 percent supported drug testing for athletes, while only 29 percent 
supported drug testing for all students.”107
Although the 1973 Rehabilitation Act prevented UMD from drug testing 
its employees and Fourth Amendment protections stood in the way of the blan-
ket testing of all students, athletes were neither employees nor regular students 
and therefore could be subject to mandatory testing. The task force had con-
sulted with the Office of the Attorney General of Maryland to ask for guidance 
on the legality of mandatory drug testing. Chief Council of the Educational 
Affairs Division James J. Mingle and Assistant Attorney General Andrea Hill 
provided the legal framework for the report’s eventual drug testing policy. In a 
letter to the task force in November 1986, Mingle and Hill cautioned, “Manda-
tory testing of employees in general would be legally permissible only if based 
on particularized probable cause.”108 Moreover, terminating an employee based 
on a positive test would conflict with Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973, which outlawed “employment and other discrimination against an ‘oth-
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erwise qualified handicapped individual,’ including a person who is an alcohol 
or drug abuser.” In turn, they advised the task force that “a mandatory testing 
requirement which would subject the entire student body to actual testing or to 
the possibility of random testing would violate the Fourth Amendment prohi-
bition against ‘unreasonable searches and seizures.’” However, the testing of 
students “on a categorical and individualized basis would be constitutionally 
permissible.” For example, Mingle and Hill contended that the testing of ath-
letes could be “justified on the grounds of health, performance and safety in an 
organized activity which is integral to the institution and its purposes.”109 They 
emphasized, “Student athletes should expect less privacy, given both the tradi-
tional emphasis on physical performance and the associated examinations and 
training regimen. By the same token, the University has a legitimate interest in 
the physical and competitive event, the integrity of athletic competition and the 
reputation of the institution.” Not only was this intrusion into athletes’ bodily 
privacy necessary to safeguard their health but also to safeguard the NCAA and 
the university from possible drug scandals in the future.
The task force report elaborated on this rationale for the mandatory drug 
testing of “student athletes,” particularly black athletes. It warned, “The po-
tential for drug abuse now threatens (1) the health of collegiate athletes, (2) 
the public’s confidence in athletic departments and (3) the academic reputation 
of many colleges and universities.”110 In doing so, it hinted at the anxiety sur-
rounding having black athletes as the public face of UMD. Indeed, the report 
emphasized, “In some highly visible intercollegiate sports, the participants are 
subjected to special pressure from the external and internal community to use 
controlled dangerous substances.” In other words, the black men who domi-
nated UMD basketball and football were particularly susceptible to drug use, 
given both their connections to black communities outside the university and 
their vaunted status on campus. The report recommended that “student ath-
letes” who fit these “dual criteria” should “be required to undergo random drug 
testing with prior consent required.”111 Thus, building on the advice of the Of-
fice of the Attorney General, the task force report argued for the stripping of 
athletes’, and in particular black athletes’, rights to bodily privacy. However, 
the report did not stop there, for it recast their athletic labor as a “privilege” that 
came with certain obligations. “For athletes to carry the name of an institution 
of higher learning into competition, for athletes to use the university as a step-
ping stone to professional sports, for athletes to gain an athletic scholarship,” 
the report argued, “athletes should reasonably agree to advance the institution 
by supporting its goals and objectives and by refraining from health behavior 
that might affect athletic performance.”112 For the privilege to play, athletes had 
to give up their privacy.
In addition to targeted drug testing, the report advocated for more system-
atic policing and punishment. The task force noted that at UMD, much as it was 
at other universities across the nation, drug policy enforcement in residential 
areas was still largely the purview of university staff rather than campus police 
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or other law enforcement agencies. In the specific case of UMD dormitories, 
resident assistants tended to deal with student misconduct on an ad hoc basis. 
There was no systematic process for dealing with student drug violations, and 
campus police did not regularly patrol the residences.113
University drug education efforts were not any better. The task force’s re-
search revealed that most drug counseling and education services on college 
campuses, including UMD, were not only short-staffed and underfunded, but 
also underutilized by students. The report recommended that the university 
“provide a systematic drug education and prevention program, designed to 
reach all segments of the Campus community and well developed and staffed 
by professionals in the field.”114 It also advocated for the establishment of a 
“Center for Drug Abuse Education, Abuse Prevention, and Research,” which 
the task force hoped would become an important hub of drug research and edu-
cation for both UMD and the nation.
Nevertheless, the task force seemed much more preoccupied with ques-
tions of drug enforcement. The report supported the establishment of more ro-
bust campus police forces and increased cooperation between university police 
and other law enforcement agencies—in effect criminalizing student behaviors 
that had previously been addressed by civilian staff members. The report rec-
ommended that UMD “enlarge the staff of its police department for more ef-
fectiveness throughout the Campus and particularly in residential areas of the 
Campus” and even supported the establishment of a “confidential drug tip hot-
line” and “the appropriate use of anonymous surveillance personnel.”115 These 
proposals flew in the face of previous court decisions about student privacy 
rights in college dormitories.116
In addition to more intrusive policing, the task force recommended the ex-
pansion of UMD’s student code of conduct to specify the penalties for the use, 
sale, and possession of illegal drugs. It encouraged harsher punishments, in-
cluding expulsion for a first-time offence of selling and for a second offence of 
possession.117 The report maintained that severe penalties would “send a clear 
message to the community that drug use would not be tolerated on campus.”118 It 
also acknowledged that the enforcement of more extensive disciplinary policies 
would require that UMD expand its campus police department. Recognizing 
that these strategies could be construed as punitive, the task force assured that 
their desire was “not to create an oppressive campus environment.”119 However, 
in embracing the prevailing strategies of the national war on drugs—the expan-
sion of policing, criminal punishment, and targeted drug testing—UMD’s drug 
task force report revealed that the university was by no means immune to the 
neoliberal, carceral logic of society at large. This orientation would have impli-
cations not just for civil and labor rights of “student athletes” but for those of 
students and university workers more broadly.
Given these connections, how can we account for the relative silence and 
inaction of humanities scholars about the need for systemic change in big-time 
intercollegiate athletics? What explains our inability to see the relationship be-
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tween the insecure status of black “student athletes,” our ongoing discussions 
of neoliberalism and the carceral state, and our critical analyses of the casu-
alization of labor in the corporatized university? Since the 1970s, NCAA and 
university officials have proven largely successful at casting black athletic work 
as both privilege and play, while also representing themselves as altruistic pro-
viders of black opportunity. As the public face of big-time intercollegiate sports 
darkened, the NCAA and its member institutions capitalized on prevailing dis-
courses of black pathology and criminality to push the conversation toward 
minor reforms and the disciplining of individual players, rather than systemic 
change. Today, black “student athletes” still occupy a liminal status on campus, 
somewhere between that of student and worker. University faculty and officials 
who care about the rights of all on campus can no longer remain ambivalent 
about their presence and the labor they perform in the name of higher educa-
tional institutions.
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